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Abstract 
 This paper explores the impact of communications by the Federal Reserve on 
financial market returns before and after the financial crisis. It specifically looks at 
whether markets’ responses to communication differ depending on the source and 
depending on whether the tone is positive or negative. I extract the tone used in 
communications by using tools from computational linguistics to create a measure based 
on the number of positive and negative words appearing in a communication. Using this 
measurement for tone, I find that market returns respond more to the tone of 
communications after the financial crisis. Second, I find the tone used by the chairperson 
has a greater impact than the tone of other individuals. Finally, I find that stock market 
returns react positively to positive and negative statements after the financial crisis, 
which implies language suggesting a rate increase is ignored by markets once the zero-
lower bound was reached.  
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1 Introduction 
 Communication by central banks has become an increasingly important aspect of 
monetary policy. Through communication, central banks are able to provide the public 
with information on their current and future policy objectives, their economic outlook, 
and likely path for future monetary policy decisions (Blinder et. al 2008). By 
communicating this information, a central bank is able to influence market expectations 
about the future path of both short and long-term interest rates. The influence on long-
term rates through communication can then enhance the overall effectiveness of 
monetary policy because long-term rates have a more important role when it comes to 
household and business decisions (Lucca and Trebbia 2009).  
 Although the importance of communication is recognized by all central banks 
today, this has not always been the case.  Prior to the 1990s, central banks believed they 
should say as little as possible. Alan Greenspan even prided himself on his ability to 
“mumble with great incoherence” (Blinder et. al 2008). This strategy was founded in the 
belief that to in order to achieve monetary policy goals, the Federal Reserve needed to 
surprise financial market with its actions. The Federal Reserve began to change its 
approach to communication with the public in 1994 when it started releasing statements 
regarding its decisions on the Federal funds rate target after Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) policy meetings ended rather than making the market infer its 
decision from open market operations taken the next day. In May 1999, they began to 
release a statement after every meeting, regardless of whether there was a change in 
monetary policy. Ever since then, the statements have also contained information about 
the future path of monetary policy in some form. The FOMC also began to announce the 
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votes of the participants immediately after the meeting and expedited the release of the 
FOMC minutes. Since the financial crisis, the Fed has taken even more steps to improve 
its communication in order to provide additional policy stimulus and to reduce 
uncertainty once interest rates reached the zero-lower bound. The Federal Reserve 
chairperson now gives four press conferences a year. Additionally, the Fed has begun to 
release the forecasts of the members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of the 
Federal Reserve Banks for growth, unemployment, inflation, and the Federal funds rate 
on a quarterly basis. It has also increased its use of forward guidance and begun using 
more explicit language when discussing the future of the Federal funds rate target by 
providing the market with specific guidelines for how long and under what economic 
conditions interest rates would stay at the zero-lower bound. 1 
 For the communication advances of the Federal Reserve to have the desired 
effect, the communication must convey useful information, and the market participants 
must pay attention to the information and respond appropriately. However, the Federal 
Reserve does not communicate with the markets through one channel. Instead, it conveys 
information with formal channels, such as the FOMC statements and minutes, and with 
less formal channels, such as speeches made by the chairperson, members of the Board of 
Governors, and presidents of the Federal Reserve banks. Markets may not respond in the 
same way to each communication type. Moreover, markets may not respond the same 
                                                      
1 An example of this explicit language occurred at the December 2012 meeting, when the FOMC said, “this 
exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment 
rate remains above 6½ percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a 
half percentage point above the committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal and longer-term inflation 
expectations continue to be well anchored” (Wynne 2013).  
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way to communication that is more positive about the economy as it would to 
communication that is more negative.  
 These potential asymmetric reactions as well as the evolution of Federal Reserve 
communication since the financial crisis are the main motivations for this study. In this 
paper I explore how financial market variable reactions to communication tone depend 
both on the source of communication and on the sign tone. Additionally, I examine 
whether these reactions are different in the periods before and after the financial crisis. I 
do this by first extracting the tone of communications using a method from computational 
linguistics that creates a measure based on the number of positive and negative words 
appearing in a communication. I then group the tone measurements by their source and 
create separate variables for positive and negative tone for each source. Finally, I 
estimate the reactions of financial market returns to these measures of tone both before 
and after the crisis. From these estimations, I find that communication tone as whole was 
more important after the financial crisis, that the tone used by the chairperson has larger 
impact than other individual members of the Federal Reserve, and that positive 
statements by the FOMC cause an increase in the S&P 500 Index following the financial 
crisis.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I summarize the 
relevant literature and how this paper contributes to it. In section 3, I explain how I 
collected data on Federal Reserve communication events and how I measure their tone 
using computational linguistics. I also explain what other variables and news may affect 
financial market variables and how I measured them. In section 4, I present the model 
specifications I will use to explore the impact of tone on financial market returns. I 
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discuss the main findings of the estimation of the model in Section 5, and I summarize 
the paper and discuss possible extensions in Section 7.    
2 Literature Review 
 There is already an extensive body of literature that examines the impact of 
Federal Reserve communication on asset prices. However, with the exception of few 
recent studies, most of the literature up to date has either focused on evaluating whether 
asset prices respond to any communication without considering potential differences 
between negative and positive communication, or has used relatively subjective measures 
of what types of communication are considered positive of negative 
 Gürkaynak et. al (2005) use an event-study approach to analyze the effects of 
FOMC statement releases on financial market movements around the time of the releases. 
Their study discovers there are two factors that affect the reactions of financial markets to 
information contained in FOMC statements. The first factor that affects markets is the 
unexpected change in the Federal funds rate, and the second is the information about the 
future path of monetary policy that is communicated to the market. They also find the 
informational factor, known as the “path” factor, affects longer term yields more strongly 
than the unexpected change in the federal funds rate. In a recent study, Swanson (2017) 
extends the analysis of Gürkaynak et. al to current day and obtains similar results for the 
effect of the path factor on longer term yields. He also finds the path factor affects bonds 
of even longer maturities after the financial crisis as more emphasis is placed on forward 
guidance. Kohn and Sack (2004) examine the impact of speeches, testimony, and FOMC 
Statements under the Greenspan regime and find that both statements and testimony 
affect market interest rates. Chirinko and Curran (2013) confirm this result and also find 
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that these communications significantly affect bond market volatility. Apergis (2014) 
examines the impact of the FOMC meeting minutes on asset prices and shows that the 
release of minutes increases the mean return on longer maturities.  
 Additional papers extend beyond just examining whether or not there is a reaction 
to Federal Reserve communication and explore how markets react to the content of the 
communication. Rosa (2011) compares whether the market reacts differently to hawkish 
and dovish FOMC statements. He determines whether or not a released FOMC statement 
was hawkish or dovish and compares this score to what markets expected the content of 
the statement to be.  By subtracting the actual content from the expected content, he is 
able to find the “surprise” component of policy statements Unexpectedly hawkish 
statements have a significant impact on stock indices, causing a decline in stock prices. 
Furthermore, the impact of the surprise component of monetary content is greater than 
the impact of the surprise component of monetary policy action. Farka (2011) also 
analyzes the content of FOMC statements and classifies them as either informative or 
uninformative. She finds that informative statements have a larger impact on both the 
volatility and returns of Treasuries and the stock market. Ehramann and Fratzcher (2007), 
using newswire reports about FOMC communication, find that speeches and interviews 
that are related to the economic outlook have a positive impact on bond returns for 
maturities of up to ten years while speeches and interviews simply related to monetary 
policy news only affects shorter maturities.  
 Hayo et. al (2014) classify all speeches made by Federal Reserve Bank presidents, 
members of the Board of Governors, and the chairperson of the Federal Reserve based on 
their content regarding monetary policy and economic outlook. Their study has several 
  7 
 
 
main findings: shorter maturities are affected in a meaningful way by the content in 
speeches, chairperson speeches generate larger market reactions than other positions, and 
central bank communication is ever more relevant after the financial crisis.  
 While the previous papers delve more into the content of communication, they do 
not measure it in a systematic way; communication is coded based on the authors’ 
subjective opinions after reading the relevant communication. More recent papers have 
improved upon this measure by applying more computational approaches to measuring 
the content in Federal Reserve Communications in order to get more objective and 
consistent measurements of the communication content. Bligh and Hess (2010) apply a 
content analysis software to speeches, testimonies, and FOMC statements made during 
Greenspan’s tenure as chair to compute measurements of their certainty, pessimism, 
optimism, activity, immediacy, and jargon. Using these measurements of content, they 
find more pessimistic language is consistent with a decline in the Federal funds futures 
rates. Smales and Apergis (2017) measure the complexity of FOMC statements by 
computing a readability score and counting the number of words in a statement. An 
increase in the complexity of statements results in higher return volatility in stock, bond, 
and currency markets. Lucca and Trebbi (2009) evaluate the content surprise of an 
FOMC statement by evaluating news articles discussing the statement before and after its 
release. For the periods before and after the release, they compute a semantic score based 
on the amount of words associated with positive and negative target rate movements in 
the articles. They then measure the content surprise as the difference between the 
semantic score before and after the release. Using this measurement, they find that longer 
term treasuries react more strongly to changes in policy communication than to changes 
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in policy rates. Hansen and McMahon (2015) compute a semantic score similar to Lucca 
and Trebbi, but instead of evaluating news reports about FOMC statements, they compute 
an economic situation score from the FOMC statement itself using words associated with 
an economic expansion and contraction.  
 This paper will contribute both to the more general study of the impact of Federal 
Reserve communications on financial markets and to the study of these communications 
using computational linguistic tools. I contribute to the first strand by examining the 
reaction of markets to all forms of Federal Reserve communications⎯minutes, 
statements, and speeches by bank presidents, members of the Board of Governors, and 
the chairperson of the Federal Reserve⎯ and comparing the reaction to each type of 
communication. I also contribute to the growing literature that applies techniques from 
computational linguistics by measuring the tone of a communication with a dictionary 
method that creates a ratio based on the amount of positive and negative words used. By 
using this technique, I create a consistent measure of tone that can easily be applied to all 
communications by the Federal Reserve. 
3 Data 
3.1 Federal Reserve communications  
3.1.1 Dates and Content of Communication 
 To perform an analysis on financial market reaction to Federal Reserve 
communication content, I first create a dataset of the dates and text of all FOMC 
statements, minutes, and speeches by Federal Reserve Bank presidents, members of the 
Board of Governors, and the chairperson of the Federal Reserve Bank from May 1999 to 
March 2018. I choose this range because the statement began to include the Fed’s view 
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on prospective economic development in May 1999. Earlier statements from 1994 to 
1999 were only released when there was a change in the federal funds rate and were used 
to simply notify the market of the change funds rate (Farka 2009). By limiting the sample 
to the period after 1999, I ensure that the purpose of the FOMC statement release is the 
same across the sample.  
 To accurately measure the response of financial markets to Federal Reserve 
communication content, it is crucial to accurately record the time at which markets would 
react to the information in the communication. Because FOMC statements are released at 
a predefined time of 2:00 P.M. on the last day of an FOMC meeting, I record their date as 
the day of release. As the release is early in the afternoon, markets will still be able to 
trade until close at 5:00 P.M., so the impact of the content of the statements should be 
incorporated by the end of the day (Bernanke 2005). Minutes, like statements, are 
released on a predefined schedule. Prior to 2004, they were released two days after the 
meeting that followed the meeting the minutes were recorded at. In December 2004, the 
Committee pushed the publication forward and began releasing them three weeks after 
the meeting (Jung 2016). Due to this consistent release pattern and their 2:00 P.M. release 
time, I also record their date as the date of release.  
 Unlike statements and minutes, speeches are irregularly timed. Thus, it is harder 
to determine when and if a communication event occurred. A common approach is to 
examine financial newswire reports and use the day of their reporting about a speech as 
the date the communication took place. However, this approach has major drawbacks 
because news organizations are selective in their reporting and may not cover all 
speeches that the market may consider relevant. Thus, I use the approach of Hayo et. al 
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(2014) and record the date financial markets should react as the day a speech was given if 
the speech occurs before the market closes on a weekday. If a speech occurs after trading 
hours, I record its date as the following day because markets would not have been able to 
react on the day it was given. If a speech occurs on a weekend, I assign its date as the 
following Monday. With this approach, I ensure that every piece of news created is 
captured even if financial news services do not report on it.  
 In order to examine the content of communications directly rather than through an 
intermediary like a news service, I obtain the transcript for all statements, minutes, and 
speeches. I download both statements and minutes transcripts from the Federal Reserve’s 
official website and collect 162 FOMC statements and 154 minutes. Of the statements, all 
but nine were released after the eight scheduled FOMC policy meetings that occur each 
year. The nine unscheduled statements were released after unscheduled FOMC meetings 
where either the policy rate was changed unexpectedly, or additional policy actions 
aimed to aid markets during the financial crisis were announced.2 Four of the minutes 
were associated with these unscheduled meetings but were released with the minutes of 
the next scheduled meetings.3 
 I obtain the transcripts of speeches made by the presidents of the twelve Federal 
Reserve Banks from their respective websites and from FRASER, which is the economic 
history website maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. I also obtain 
speeches from the members of the Board of Governors and from the chairperson of the 
                                                      
2 The dates of these meetings are 1/3/2001, 9/17/2001, 8/10/2007, 8/17/2007, 1/22/2008, 3/11/2008, 
10/8/2008, 5/10/2010, 10/30/2013, and 3/19/2014.  
3 The dates of the unscheduled meetings minutes release were 10/9/2007(2 were released), 11/20/2013, and 
4/9/2014.  
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Federal Reserve from FRASER. In total, I collect the transcripts of 3,734 speeches4. 486 
of these were made by the chairperson, 920 were made by governors of the Federal 
Reserve, and 2,328 were made by presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks. 1,025 of the 
speeches made by bank presidents were made by presidents who were voting members of 
the FOMC while the remaining 1,303 speeches were made by presidents were not voting 
members of the FOMC. 5 A visualization of the compiled data set can be seen in Figure 
B1 in the Appendix.  
 
3.1.2 Measuring Content of Communication  
 To extract the tone from the transcripts, I borrow tools from computational 
linguistics. First, I clean the raw text of the transcripts. I do this by removing common 
words, such as “and” and “the”, that provide little semantic content.6 Then, I remove all 
punctuation and make the entire text lowercase. By making the text lowercase, I ensure 
case does not matter and that “Increase” and “increase” will be counted as the same word. 
Finally, I “stem” all words to their root, meaning “increasing” “increased” and “increase” 
will all be changed to “increas.”  The application of these steps reduces each transcript to 
a collection of individual words, or “tokens.”  
                                                      
4 Ninety-one of the speeches could not be found on the Federal Reserve Bank’s websites or on FRASER. I 
collect transcripts for forty-seven of them from Central Banking, which is a news organization focused on 
covering central banks. For the remaining forty-four speeches, I obtain news articles from LexisNexis that 
covered the speeches.  
5 The FOMC has twelve voting members with seven of them being the governors, one being the president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and four being presidents of the remaining eleven banks. These 
four spots are rotated every year with one president from the following groups: Boston, Philadelphia, and 
Richmond; Cleveland and Chicago; Atlanta, St. Louis, and Dallas; and Minneapolis, Kansas City, and San 
Francisco. Nonvoting presidents still attend FOMC meetings and contribute to discussions about the 
economy.  
6 A complete list of the common words removed can be found at 
http://snowball.tartarus.org/algorithms/english/stop.txt 
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 Next, I apply the “bag-of-words”, or dictionary, approach to the cleaned 
transcripts to capture their tone. In this approach, a dictionary of words associated with an 
emotion or action is defined, and a score is calculated for each document based on the 
frequency of words that are in the dictionary. This approach has been applied extensively 
in the financial literature to measure market sentiment. For example, Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) construct a list of words associated with negativity in the financial 
context and use it to calculate the negativity in company 10-K filings.  
 I use “directional” word lists that measure words associated with expansion and 
contraction that were defined by Apel and Brix Grimaldi (2012). The full list of words 
associated with expansion and contraction can be seen in Table 1 below. I choose this 
dictionary list because it has been applied by both Hansen and McMahon (2015) and 
Bennani and Neuenkirch (2015) to measure the tone of communication by a central bank.  
Using this dictionary, I measure the tone of each communication as follows:  
         (1) 
   
 Based on this specification, the value of tone is bounded between -1 and 1, with 1 
representing the most positive tone and -1 representing the most negative tone.  
Table 1: Words Associated with Expansions and Contractions 
Expansion  Contraction  
Improv Moder 
Foster Slow  
Increas Low 
Expand Weak 
Rise Subdu 
Higher Lower 
Risen Fall 
Gain Slower 
Strong Weaker 
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Acceler Decreas 
Faster Weaken 
Strength  Contract 
 Soften 
 Decler 
 Cool 
 Since multiple communication events often occur on the same day, I create a tone 
variable that is the average of the tone of all communication events that occurred on any 
given day (Avg Tone). To account for the fact that tone is more often positive by this 
measurement and in order to standardize the data, I subtract the median value of the 
average tone over the whole sample, so that the tone on each day is capturing the relative 
positivity or negativity of communication. Since the tone of individual communication 
events could vary widely on any given day, I also create a measure of the disparity in 
tone (Tone Disp) for each day be subtracting the minimum value of tone from the 
maximum value of tone.  
 However, the two previous measures fail to capture the fact that markets may 
reaction differently to communication depending on its source. Hayo et. al (2014) find 
that speeches by the chairman cause larger financial market reactions than speeches by 
presidents and governors. In another paper, Hayo and Neuenkirch (2013) find that the 
content of non-voting presidents speeches can be better explained by regional 
macroeconomic variables than by national macroeconomic variables. This dynamic could 
cause markets to pay less attention to their tone as it is a response to regional, not national 
conditions that would have more of an effect on the market. FOMC statements’ tone may 
also have a larger impact on markets due to the “black-out” period the week before an 
FOMC meeting where FOMC members cannot discuss monetary policy in speeches 
(Lucca and Moench 2015). This silent period could lead to heightened market 
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uncertainty, and thus more attention will be paid to the content of the statements than to 
other types of communication. To account for these potential dynamic, I also create tone 
measurements that are broken out by the source of the communication⎯an FOMC 
statement (Stmt Tone), FOMC minutes (Min Tone), a speech by a nonvoting president 
(NVP Tone), a speech by a voting president (VP Tone), a speech by a governor (Gov 
Tone), and a speech by a chairperson (Chair Tone).  For each of these measurements, I 
also subtract the median value as was done with the average tone. I summarize the seven 
tone types in Tables A1 in the Appendix.  
  The use of only one variable for the tone may miss important asymmetric 
dynamics that occur in the stock market in response to positive or negative tone or 
positive and negative shocks in general. Although conventional economic analysis 
assumes market participants are rational, this is not always the case. Participants often 
react based on emotion and intuition. Keynes (1936) refers to this emotional decision 
making as the “animal spirits” of the market. Due to these “animal spirits”, the market 
may react differently to negative and positive events. This asymmetry in reaction to an 
event depending on if it is positive and negative has been found in many recent studies. 
For example, Barnichon et al. (2017) find that negative shocks to the credit supply have 
large and persistent effects on output while positive credit shocks have no significant 
effect. In a different paper, Barnichon and Matthes (2018) examine the size of the 
government spending multiplier and find the multiplier associated with a negative shock 
to government spending is greater than one while the multiplier associated with a positive 
shock to government spending is much less than one. Shu et al. (2009) look at the 
reaction of stock prices to good news and bad news disclosures by public companies and 
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discover the magnitude of the negative reaction to bad news disclosures is much greater 
than the magnitude of the positive reaction to good news.  
 Based on these studies, it is possible the markets would react much more strongly 
to the presence of negative tone in communication from the Federal Reserve than to the 
presence of positive tone. To allow for these possible asymmetric reactions to tone, I 
create positive and negative tone variables for each communication source, with the value 
of the negative tone variable equaling the absolute value of any tone that is less than zero 
and the positive tone variable equaling the value of any tone greater than zero. I 
summarize these variables both before and after the financial crisis in Tables A2 and A3 
in the Appendix.7 
3.2 Monetary Policy Measurement  
 In order to properly measure the responses of financial market variables to the 
tone of Federal Reserve communication, I also need to control for any surprise changes in 
monetary policy that could also affect markets. Only monetary policy surprises need to be 
accounted for because, under the rational markets hypothesis, markets are forward 
looking and will have already incorporated any expected changes in monetary policy 
before the policy is announced. Therefore, on the day of an announcement, expected 
changes in the federal funds target rate should have little or no effect on the market 
(Bernanke 2005).  
 To measure the surprise component of monetary policy, I use the change in the 
Federal funds futures rate. The Federal funds futures rate contacts are a market-based 
                                                      
7 I separate the variables pre and post-financial crisis because the average values for the tones are different 
in the two periods due to the long period of recovery that followed the crisis.  
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proxy of the expectations of the future of monetary policy. On the day before a monetary 
policy announcement, the futures rate will reflect what the market expects rates to be. 
After an announcement is made, the futures rate will reflect the actual rate change. Thus, 
by finding the difference in the futures rate the day before a monetary policy 
announcement and the day of an announcement, the surprise component of the policy can 
be computed.  
 However, an issue arises because the federal funds futures settlement price is 
based on the monthly average Federal funds rate. Using the method developed by Kuttner 
(2001), I account for this problem by scaling up the change in the Federal funds futures 
rate to reflect the number of days in the month affected by the change. This adjustment 
makes the surprise change in the Federal funds for a date, t, equal to  
      (2) 
 
, where D is the number of days in the month, 𝑓𝑚,𝑡
0  is the futures rate on day t of month m, 
and 𝑓𝑚,𝑡−1
0  is the futures rate from the day before t.  
 With this equation, I calculate the Federal funds rate surprise for the 162 days on 
which the FOMC announced its decision regarding the Federal funds rate using daily 30-
day Federal funds futures contracts purchased from the Stevens Continuous Financial 
Database.8 A visualization of the surprise during the sample can be seen in Figure B2 in 
the Appendix.  
                                                      
8 This database is available at https://www.quandl.com/data/SCF-Continuous-Futures. I use the CBOT 30-
day Federal Funds Futures #2 (FF2) - Unadjusted Prices, Roll on First of Month, Continuous Contract 
History series.  
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3.3 Macroeconomic Data 
 Monetary policy surprises are not the only additional factor that can affect 
financial market variables. Financial markets can also react to major macroeconomic 
releases. Due to the high number of days communication events occur on, many 
macroeconomic data releases also occur on the same day. Therefore, I also need to 
control for the surprise component of major macroeconomic data releases that are closely 
watched by market participants. I consider the same thirteen data releases as Kohn and 
Sack (2003) and Bligh and Hess (2010) that were found to have a significant effect on the 
three-month ahead Federal funds futures contract:  employment cost index (ECI), 
advance GDP (GDP), capacity utilization rate (CUR), consumer sentiment index (CS), 
core consumer price index (CPI), durable goods orders (DGO), Institute of Supply 
Management Index (ISM), non-farm payroll employment (NFP), new home sales (NHS), 
core producer price index (PPI), retail sales (RS), unemployment rate (UR), and initial 
claims for unemployment (JC). I construct the surprise for each release by finding the 
difference between the actual reported number from the first data release and the number 
from the most recent market survey (Kohn and Sack 2003). Since all data releases occur 
during the time period in which markets are trading, I record the date of a surprise as the 
day on which the data was released.  
 All but two of these releases are from governmental organizations and can be 
found on various government websites. I obtain data on advance retail sales (month over 
month percentage change), new home sales (total home sales, annualized) and durable 
goods orders (month over month percentage change) from the United States Census 
Bureau. Data on all three measurements is released on a monthly basis, so I have 226 
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release dates for each. I also obtain data on the employment cost index (month over 
month percentage change), producer price index (less energy and foods, year over year 
change), consumer price index (urban consumers less food and energy, month over 
month change), non-farm payroll employment (total change since last month), and the 
unemployment rate from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data on the 
producer price index, consumer price index, unemployment rate, and non-farm payrolls 
are released on a monthly basis, so I have 226 release dates for each. Employment cost 
index data is only released quarterly, so I have 76 release dates in the sample. The data on 
the capacity utilization rate was obtained from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
website. Since capacity utilization is a monthly announcement as well, I get 226 release 
dates. I find data on the weekly initial claims for unemployment insurance from the 
Department of Labor. Since this release is weekly, there are 987 releases during the 
sample. I also find data on the first release of advance GDP (annual percentage growth 
rate) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s real-time dataset and end up with 
76 release dates as GDP estimates are announced on a quarterly basis. 9  
 I obtain data on the Institute of Supply Management Index from the Institute of 
Supply Management’s database that is housed on the website Quandl.10 For the 
measurement of consumer sentiment, there are two commonly used indexes: The 
Consumer Confidence Index published by the Conference Board and the University of 
Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index. Due to availability of data, I use the latter 
measurement and collect the data from University of Michigan’s website.11 Both the 
                                                      
9 All data is seasonally adjusted.  
10 https://www.quandl.com/data/ISM-Institute-for-Supply-Management 
11 The Index is normalized to have a value of 100 in 1964 
  19 
 
 
Consumer Sentiment Index and the Institute of Supply Management Index are released 
monthly, so I collect 226 release dates for both measures.  
 For all data releases except advance GDP, I find the median of survey forecasts 
on the day before the data release on Bloomberg.12 For GDP, I use forecasted value for 
GDP from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional 
Forecasters. Then, I subtract these subtract these forecasted values from the value of the 
data release to obtain the surprise. To standardize the levels of the surprises, I divide the 
surprise value by the actual data release value for all series that are not in percentage 
changes.  
3.4 Financial Market Data 
 Caggiano et al. (2017) find that uncertainty affects markets, particularly after the 
Great Recession. To control for this effect, I obtain data on the VIX Index from the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange and use it as proxy for market uncertainty. Ajayi and 
Mougoue (1996) also find that fluctuations in the United States exchange rate can affect 
the stock market, so I gather daily data on the broad US foreign exchange rate index from 
the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) to account for this dynamic.  
 In order to determine the financial market reaction to Federal Reserve 
communication, I collect data on daily market yields for 1-month, 3-month and 1-year 
Treasury bills and 2-year, 3-year, 5-year, 7-year, and 10-year Treasury notes from the 
                                                      
12 The specific series are as follows: RSTAMOM (retail sales), ECI SA% (employment cost index), 
CPICHNG (consumer price index), CONNSENT (consumer sentiment), CPUPXCHG (consumer price 
index), DGNOCHNG (durable goods orders), NAPMMII (Institute of Supply Management Index), 
NFPTCH (non-farm payrolls), NHSTOT (new home sales), PPIXYOY (producer price index), USURTOT 
(unemployment rate), INJC (initial claims for unemployment). The series are missing survey data for retail 
sales from 1999-2001 and producer price index from 1999-2008. For these dates, I forecast the values of 
retail sales and producer price index with a seasonally adjusted ARMA model and use these forecasted 
values as the survey value when computing the surprise.  
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Federal Reserve’s Statistical Releases13. I then compute the daily return as the change in 
the yields by subtracting the yield from the day before from the current day’s yield. 
Additionally, I collect daily data on the S&P 500 Index from the Yahoo! Finance 
database and compute the daily return as 
100 ∗ ln⁡(
𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑡−1
) 
, where 𝑝𝑡 is the price the day of and 𝑝𝑡−1 is the price the day before.  
4 Model  
 Following Hayo et. al (2014), I use daily data when estimating the effect of 
communication content on asset returns. This is because I am interested in economically 
important effects that persist over time, not just minor responses that happen at the time 
of the event and then die out within a minute or within an hour. Additionally, the precise 
time of speech delivery is not known, only the scheduled delivery time. Thus, it would 
not be possible to measure the response on a minute by minute level.   
 Descriptive statistics in Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix show that all financial 
market series exhibit excess kurtosis, which indicates the presence of autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effects (Engle 1982). Therefore, I will use an 
event-study ARCH model of order one to estimate the effect of communication tone on 
daily returns financial variables. To examine the effects of average tone, type specific 
tone, positive and negative tone, I will estimate the following four model specifications:  
                                                      
13 For the 1-month Treasury bill, I only collect data from July 31st 2001 as that is when it started trading. 
For all other variables, there is data from May 1999- March 2018.  
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 (3) 
 
 (4) 
 (5) 
 (6) 
The error term is defined as 
                 (7) 
 for each model, where 𝑧𝑡 is the stochastic part, and 𝜎𝑡⁡is time-dependent standard 
deviation. The variance is then defined as  
               (8) 
 In each regression, I allow the financial variables’ returns, 𝑅𝑡 , to respond to the 
surprise component of FOMC monetary policy (∆𝑓𝑓𝑡
𝑢), macroeconomic data release 
surprises (𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑢), the volatility index (𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡), and the lag of the return of the foreign 
exchange rate index (𝐹𝑋𝑡−1). Additionally, because asset returns are known to differ 
depending on the day of the week (Gibbons and Hess 1981), I also include dummies to 
control for day of the week effects, with Monday being the reference day. To control for 
potential autoregressive dynamics, I also include one lag of the of the specific bond being 
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regressed on as well as one lag of stock returns. When regressing on stock returns, I use 
the lag of the three-month Treasury bill as the bond return, as was done in Hayo et al 
(2014).  
 After estimating the previous four ARCH(1) model specifications, I exclude all 
insignificant variables to obtain the most reduced model, using the general-to-specific 
approach (Hendry 1995).  
5 Empirical Results 
 I am most interested in the estimation of equation 6 for the period before and after 
the financial crisis. This specification accounts for the existence of asymmetric reactions 
to positive and negative tone and to who or what is the source of the tone. Using split 
sample analysis for the periods before and after the financial crisis, I will also capture any 
changes in market reactions that occurred due to the crisis and the following increased 
emphasis on Federal Reserve communications. For robustness, I include the estimations 
of equations 3 through 5 to show the need for disaggregating tone by type and source and 
for estimating it pre and post crisis.  
5.1 Impact of More General Specifications of Tone 
 The results of the estimation of Equation 3 for the full sample can be found in 
Tables A6 and A7 in the Appendix. The coefficient on average tone is insignificant on 
five of the financial market series, and when it is significant, the impact is small except 
for the impact on the S&P 500 Index. These results are expected since average tone is 
constructed by averaging the tone for all communication events that occurred in a day 
and does not distinguish the tone by type of communication.  
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 There is reason to believe that the reaction to tone may depend on the source of 
the communication tone (see Section 3.1.2). To account for these potential dynamics, I 
follow the method of Hayo et al. (2014) and estimate equation 3 where tone is split by 
communication type for the full sample, and the results can be found in Tables A8 and 
A9 in the Appendix. By disaggregating the tone by type, I am able to find that statement 
tone has a significantly positive impact on all bond returns with a matrutiy of less than 5-
years and that it also has a significantly negative impact on the returns of the S&P 500 
Index. 14 These results show that there is a need to disaggregate by the source of the tone 
in order to obtain meaningful results.  
 The source type is not the only characteristic of tone that might affect the impact 
on financial markets. Whether the tone is positive or negative could also affect the 
impact, as markets often have asymmetric reactions to positive and negative shocks. 
Therefore, I estimate equation 5 for the full sample and present the results in Tables A10 
and A11 in the Appendix. As with the average tone in Equation 1, the majority of the 
coefficients on positive and negative tone are insignificant.  
 Another possible source of differing impacts of tone is the financial crisis. With 
Federal funds rate constrained by its effective lower bound, the Federal Reserve used 
communication as a way to provide further policy stimulus by lowering expectations of 
future interest rates (Bernanke 2012). This new policy tool may have increased the 
importance of the tone as communication events would contain more information about 
the future of monetary policy than they did before the crisis. Additionally, since monetary 
                                                      
14 The coefficient on statements (and all other subsequent tone coefficients) can be interpreted as follows: 
0.0197 denotes an increase by 1.97 bps after a perfectly positive statement with a tone score of one is 
released.   
  24 
 
 
policy had never been conducted at the zero-lower bound before the financial crisis, there 
was greater uncertainty overall about the future of monetary policy (Plante et. al 2017). 
Due to this increased uncertainty, markets may react more to communication events after 
the start of the financial crisis.  
 Due to these two reasons, I re-estimate equations 3 through 5 for only the dates 
after the start of the financial crisis.15 The results can be found in Tables A12-A17 in the 
Appendix. Based on the results, there is evidence for the theory that tone impact could 
have changed after the financial crisis. For example, the magnitude of the coefficient on 
both governor and statement tone doubled when restricting the period to the post crisis 
period.   
5.2 Impact of Type Specific Positive and Negative Tone  
 Due to the shortcomings of the previously evaluated models, I now estimate 
equation 6 with tone split by both source and sign for the full sample. The results of this 
estimation can be seen in Tables A18 and A19 in the Appendix. These results show there 
was a need to control for variables other than the tone of communications. The Federal 
funds rate surprises have a positive impact on bond returns up the 5-year Treasury note 
and have negative impact on stocks returns. This result is consistent with expectations 
that an increase in interest rates should increase the yields on bonds and lower stock 
prices. Many of the macroeconomic surprises also have a significant impact on the 
                                                      
15 I choose August 17, 2007 as the start date of the financial crisis because on this day, the Federal Reserve 
announced it was the lowering the rate it lends to banks at half a percentage point to 5.75 percent and 
warned that “tighter credit conditions and increased uncertainty” could affect growth moving forward. This 
was a sign that the problems in the subprime mortgage market were beginning to spill over into financial 
markets, causing credit crunches, even though the economy itself was still growing and not yet in a 
recession.  
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returns of financial market variables of all maturities. The uncertainty in the market as 
measured by the VIX Index is also highly negative and significant for all financial market 
returns. Most importantly, the coefficients on positive and negative tone for sources show 
that there are differing impacts depending on the sign of the tone. This can be seen in the 
effect of governor tone on the 1, 3, and 5-year bonds. Positive tone has a strong positive 
effect on their returns while negative tone does not have a statistically significant impact.  
 However, estimating equation 6 for the full sample misses possible changes that 
occurred because of the financial crisis. Therefore, I estimate it separately for the periods 
before and after the crisis. Tables 2 and 3 show the results for the period preceding the 
financial crisis, and Tables 4 and 5 show the results for the period after the start of the 
financial crisis. 
Table 2: Reaction of Financial Market Returns to Type Specific Positive and Negative 
Tone, Pre-Financial Crisis, Short Term 
 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
Fed Funds  0.0349*** 0.0384*** 0.0500*** 0.0404*** 
  (0.0020) (0.0039) (0.0074) (0.0107) 
PPI   0.0206*   
   (0.0116)   
CPI 0.0066*     
 (0.0035)     
NHS 0.0090***     
 (0.0034)     
NFP   0.0075 0.0141* 0.0149* 
   (0.0051) (0.0083) (0.0089) 
RS 0.0093**   0.0073*** 0.0066*** 
 (0.0036)   (0.0023) (0.0025) 
GDP   0.0113** 0.0243*** 0.0222*** 
   (0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0068) 
UR   -0.0098*** -0.0109**  
   (0.0034) (0.0046)  
CUR  0.0071***   0.0113 
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Table 3: Reaction of Financial Market Returns to Type Specific Positive and Negative 
Tone, Pre-Financial Crisis, Long Term 
 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
  (0.0026)   (0.0072) 
ISM    0.0126* 0.0106 
    (0.0070) (0.0080) 
DGO  0.0071***   0.0113 
  (0.0026)   (0.0072) 
VIX Index -0.0226** -0.0477*** -0.0607*** -0.0757*** -0.0755*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0084) (0.0133) (0.0178) (0.0192) 
Pos NVP -0.0046 -0.0057 -0.0022 0.0093 0.0050 
 (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0062) (0.0097) (0.0114) 
Neg NVP -0.0050 -0.0060 -0.0066 -0.0229* -0.0186 
 (0.0084) (0.0062) (0.0078) (0.0136) (0.0148) 
Pos VP -0.0039 -0.0098* 0.0022 -0.0050 -0.0087 
 (0.0047) (0.0056) (0.0078) (0.0112) (0.0120) 
Neg VP 0.0010 -0.0082 0.0023 0.0098 0.0079 
 (0.0106) (0.0073) (0.0112) (0.0185) (0.0180) 
Pos Gov -0.0144* -0.0048 0.0266*** 0.0231 0.0203 
 (0.0086) (0.0059) (0.0086) (0.0150) (0.0152) 
Neg Gov 0.0208*** 0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0053 -0.0045 
 (0.0028) (0.0068) (0.0094) (0.0131) (0.0133) 
Pos Chair 0.0117 0.0071 0.0085 0.0142 0.0142 
 (0.0102) (0.0072) (0.0104) (0.0164) (0.0175) 
Neg Chair -0.0008 -0.0089 -0.0126 -0.0166 -0.0115 
 (0.0084) (0.0081) (0.0084) (0.0132) (0.0147) 
Pos Stmt -0.0036 -0.0166*** 0.0179* 0.0388** 0.0407* 
 (0.0073) (0.0049) (0.0095) (0.0195) (0.0220) 
Neg Stmt -0.0338*** -0.0618*** 0.0047 -0.0089 -0.0091 
 (0.0047) (0.0028) (0.0067) (0.0092) (0.0101) 
Pos Min -0.0666** -0.0190 -0.0165 -0.0040 0.0015 
 (0.0287) (0.0211) (0.0282) (0.0489) (0.0508) 
Neg Min 0.0816*** 0.0449 0.0574** 0.1361*** 0.1848*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0356) (0.0277) (0.0446) (0.0564) 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
Fed Funds 0.0335** 0.0234**  -0.6219*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0117)  (0.1512) 
PPI    -0.7538** 
    (0.3586) 
NFP 0.0335** 0.0234**  -0.6219*** 
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 In the pre-crisis period, positive statements positively affect capital market 
instruments up to 3 years while negative statements have a negative impact on only short-
term instruments. FOMC minutes with negative tone are the only communication event 
with statistically significant effects on longer term financial instruments as well as on 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
 (0.0133) (0.0117)  (0.1512) 
RS 0.0335** 0.0234**  -0.6219*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0117)  (0.1512) 
GDP 0.0335** 0.0234**  -0.6219*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0117)  (0.1512) 
CUR 0.0335** 0.0234**  -0.6219*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0117)  (0.1512) 
ISM  0.0103  -0.2248** 
  (0.0092)  (0.0917) 
VIX Index -0.0681*** -0.0576*** -0.0480** -2.2776*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0205) (0.0194) (0.3374) 
Pos NVP 0.0335** 0.0234** -0.0020 -0.6219*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0117) (0.0114) (0.1512) 
Neg NVP -0.0174 -0.0142 -0.0144 -0.1406 
 (0.0161) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.1976) 
Pos VP -0.0106 -0.0061 -0.0009 -0.0240 
 (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0122) (0.2133) 
Neg VP 0.0217 0.0207 0.0262 0.1249 
 (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0188) (0.3479) 
Pos Gov 0.0123 0.0113 0.0114 0.2326 
 (0.0152) (0.0143) (0.0134) (0.2329) 
Neg Gov -0.0012 0.0014 0.0043 0.1637 
 (0.0134) (0.0138) (0.0130) (0.2275) 
Pos Chair 0.0141 0.0077 0.0095 0.2056 
 (0.0178) (0.0172) (0.0167) (0.2979) 
Neg Chair -0.0115 -0.0044 -0.0006 -0.4586 
 (0.0165) (0.0162) (0.0151) (0.3506) 
Pos Stmt 0.0306 0.0169 0.0110 0.5414* 
 (0.0208) (0.0221) (0.0196) (0.3233) 
Neg Stmt -0.0143 0.0003 0.0003 0.2599 
 (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.0115) (0.1757) 
Pos Min -0.0003 0.0118 0.0005 0.2048 
 (0.0491) (0.0468) (0.0463) (0.6969) 
Neg Min 0.1349** 0.1320** 0.1144** -1.0605 
 (0.0627) (0.0582) (0.0516) (0.7908) 
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shorter term. This dynamic is explained by the fact that minutes are released on a delayed 
schedule, and the economy before the financial crisis would bounce back quickly from 
economic downturns (Bordo and Haubrich 2016). So, while the minutes contain negative 
content regarding the economy, by the time they are released, policy actions to address 
the economic situation have been taken, and market participants will expect the economy 
to start doing better. This means returns will be increasing, causing the negative tone in 
the minutes to be associated with a positive impact.    
Table 4: Reaction of Financial Market Returns to Type Specific Positive and Negative 
Tone, Post-Financial Crisis, Short Term 
 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
Fed Funds 0.0157*** 0.0127*** 0.0132*** 0.0243*** 0.0055* 
 (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0044) (0.0032) 
PPI   -0.0038*** -0.0038**  
   (0.0006) (0.0016)  
CPI  0.0029**    
  (0.0011)    
NHS   -0.0016   
   (0.0012)   
NFP  -0.0169* -0.0520***  -0.0493*** 
  (0.0087) (0.0043)  (0.0158) 
JC   0.0021** 0.0028** 0.0038** 
   (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0017) 
RS   0.0097*** 0.0157*** 0.0202*** 
   (0.0006) (0.0022) (0.0031) 
GDP  0.0131***    
  (0.0010)    
UR 0.0021** 0.0016* 0.0015   
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0011)   
CUR -0.0039***  0.0030*** 0.0064**  
 (0.0009)  (0.0012) (0.0030)  
ISM 0.0024***  -0.0012 0.0091** 0.0101* 
 (0.0008)  (0.0010) (0.0042) (0.0057) 
ECI  0.0126***    
  (0.0017)    
CS -0.0058*** -0.0050*** 0.0052***   
 (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0005)   
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Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
Table 5: Reaction of Financial Market Returns to Type Specific Positive and Negative 
Tone, Post-Financial Crisis, Long Term 
 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
DGO  0.0035***    
  (0.0007)    
VIX Index 0.0318*** 0.0089*** -0.0234*** -0.0488*** -0.0436*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0055) (0.0077) 
Pos NVP 0.0090*** -0.0049** 0.0112*** 0.0023 0.0073 
 (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0064) (0.0081) 
Neg NVP 0.0018 0.0002 0.0045* 0.0019 0.0053 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0050) (0.0075) 
Pos VP -0.0101*** -0.0013 -0.0002 0.0088 0.0061 
 (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0057) (0.0096) 
Neg VP -0.0118*** 0.0045** 0.0049* 0.0061 0.0103 
 (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0067) (0.0092) 
Pos Gov -0.0309*** 0.0036 -0.0018 0.0101 0.0056 
 (0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0104) (0.0140) 
Neg Gov 0.0098*** 0.0004 0.0009 0.0065 0.0106 
 (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0050) (0.0071) 
Pos Chair 0.0034 -0.0056* 0.0060 -0.0190** -0.0196 
 (0.0055) (0.0031) (0.0049) (0.0095) (0.0147) 
Neg Chair -0.0181*** -0.0044** -0.0058** 0.0069 -0.0013 
 (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0048) (0.0077) 
Pos Stmt 0.0076 -0.0081** -0.0190** 0.0111 0.0280* 
 (0.0076) (0.0041) (0.0086) (0.0111) (0.0149) 
Neg Stmt -0.0195*** -0.0042 -0.0115** -0.0025 0.0100 
 (0.0047) (0.0028) (0.0055) (0.0103) (0.0105) 
Pos Min 0.0289 0.0547** -0.0309 0.0479 0.1004 
 (0.0215) (0.0226) (0.0287) (0.0552) (0.0837) 
Neg Min -0.0188*** -0.0278*** -0.0248* -0.0078 -0.0199 
 (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0137) (0.0252) (0.0207) 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
NFP -0.0525** -0.0439* -0.0409  
 (0.0231) (0.0248) (0.0277)  
JC 0.0039*    
 (0.0023)    
RS 0.0230*** 0.0238*** 0.0255***  
 (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0053)  
UR 0.0077** 0.0081* 0.0070* -0.1902*** 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 After the financial crisis, I find more statistically significant coefficients for 
specific positive and negative tone types than there were before the crisis, which indicates 
that communication plays a more pronounced role during and after the financial crisis. 
Negative minutes are also no longer associated with an increase in returns in the post 
crisis period. Instead, they have a negative impact on returns on bonds with maturities of 
one year or less. This shift in reaction is consistent with changes that occurred in the 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
 (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0582) 
CUR    0.1285* 
    (0.0740) 
ISM 0.0116** 0.0163*** 0.0193*** 0.4462*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0780) 
VIX Index -0.0728*** -0.0797*** -0.0657*** -2.7738*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.1291) 
Pos NVP 0.0058 0.0057 0.0062 -0.5641*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.1666) 
Neg NVP 0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0032 -0.1720 
 (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0108) (0.1509) 
Pos VP 0.0115 0.0148 0.0142 0.3631 
 (0.0157) (0.0173) (0.0161) (0.2404) 
Neg VP 0.0095 0.0117 0.0091 0.1712 
 (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0126) (0.1908) 
Pos Gov -0.0068 -0.0017 -0.0044 0.5691 
 (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0201) (0.3507) 
Neg Gov 0.0055 0.0044 0.0008 -0.0215 
 (0.0099) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.1735) 
Pos Chair -0.0163 -0.0171 -0.0190 -0.0868 
 (0.0181) (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.3314) 
Neg Chair 0.0068 0.0126 0.0150 0.9721*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0127) (0.0122) (0.0882) 
Pos Stmt 0.0377** 0.0372* 0.0257 1.6287*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0208) (0.0220) (0.5084) 
Neg Stmt -0.0056 0.0098 0.0116 1.7279*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.1760) 
Pos Min 0.1560 0.1443 0.1398 0.4314 
 (0.1168) (0.1354) (0.1604) (1.8014) 
Neg Min -0.0487 -0.0128 0.0266 -0.7267 
 (0.0339) (0.0455) (0.0358) (0.4914) 
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economy following the financial crisis. The pattern of quick recovery from recessions 
does not exist in the economy after the crisis. Instead, the recovery of the economy has 
been sluggish in comparison (Fernald et. al 2017). Thus, by the time the negative minutes 
are released, the economic situation has not improved as it would have before the crisis, 
so they are now associated with a decline in returns. 
 I also find communication by the chairperson to be more important than other 
members of the Federal Reserve (not including minutes and statements as they are not the 
communication of one individual) in terms of the number of significant coefficients. This 
result is consistent with the results of both Hayo et. al (2014) and Rosa (2016) as both 
studies find increased reactions to the communication by the chairperson after the 
financial crisis. I also find that the returns of the S&P 500 Index react positively to 
negative tone and that returns of bonds up to 2-year maturities react negatively to 
negative tone. The sign of the reactions to negative tone make economic sense as 
negative tone would signal either a decrease in rates or the continuation of low interest 
rates, which cause the returns of bonds to fall and the returns of the S&P 500 Index to 
rise. Additionally, the reaction of the S&P 500 Index to only negative tone is in line with 
the previous studies where a negative shock had greater impact than a positive shock.  
 Additionally, negative and positive statements both have very large and 
significant positive impacts on the returns of the S&P 500 Index when compared to the 
period before the financial crisis. The strong positive reaction to negative statements is 
explained by two factors: first, a negative statement would imply that rates were going to 
stay very low, which is good for businesses and the stock market. Second, negative 
statements during this period were often accompanied by announcements of 
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unconventional monetary policy, such as the decision of the Federal Reserve to purchase 
mortgage-backed securities and other assets in order to stimulate the economy (Blinder 
2010).  These announcements would cause stock returns to go up even more than the 
simple assurance of low interest rates. The positive reaction to positive statements can be 
attributed to the fact the positive statements are a signal that the economy is doing better, 
which is good news for the stock market. Usually a positive statement would also be a 
signal for higher interest rates in the near future, which would be bad news for the stock 
market. However, from December 2008 to December 2015, the Federal funds rate stayed 
close to zero with no increases. This long period of no increases could have lowered the 
credibility of the Federal Reserve. Thus, even when a statement contained language that 
would imply an increase in the future, the market did not believe the increase would 
actually come and instead only reacted to the signal the economy was doing better.16  
6 Conclusion 
 In this paper, I study the reaction of financial market variables to the content of all 
communication by the Federal Reserve from May 1999 to March 2018. Specifically, I 
explore how financial market variable reactions to communication tone are dependent on 
both its source and on whether it is positive or negative. Additionally, I examine whether 
these reactions are different in the periods before and after the financial crisis.   
 In order to do this, I first create a dataset of the dates and transcripts of all FOMC 
statements, minutes, and speeches by the chairperson, members of the Board of 
                                                      
16 To check this interpretation, I run the regression during the period where rates were kept at 0 and find the 
response to positive statements is larger in magnitude. In the period after rates were increased for the first 
time, the response is insignificant.  
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Governors, and presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks. I then create an objective 
measure of tone based on the number of words associated with expansions and 
contractions that appear in each communication. To account for asymmetric reactions to 
the source of tone and to the sign of the tone, I also create tone measurements that are 
broken out by the source of the communication and by whether the tone is positive or 
negative. To control for other surprises that would affect financial markets, I construct 
measures for monetary policy surprises, macroeconomic surprises, and uncertainty in the 
market.  
 Using an ARCH(1) model, I then estimate the effect of tone split by both source 
and sign on financial market returns both before and after the financial crisis. I find that 
negative minutes have a large, positive effects on returns in the period before the crisis. 
After the crisis, this effect is reversed, and negative minutes are either insignificant or 
have a negative effect on returns. I also find the tone of communication is more important 
following the crisis, which indicates that communication plays a more pronounced role 
after the crisis and markets respond more to it. I also find the tone of the chairperson is 
more important than other individual members of the Fed, which makes sense since the 
chair has the most control over the course of monetary policy. Finally, I find that both 
positive and negative statements have large and positive effects on the S&P 500 Index 
after the crisis. While the negative statement effect makes economic sense, the positive 
statement impact is more surprising.  It implies that even when the Federal Reserve uses 
language that implies a positive economic outlook and thus an upcoming rate change, the 
stock market does not believe an increase in rates was coming and only responds to the 
positive news about the economy.  
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 The work of this paper could be extended by creating separate tone variables with 
one capturing the tone regarding the economic outlook and another capturing the tone 
regarding the future monetary policy stance. This could be done by applying multiple 
dictionaries instead of one as was done in this paper. The response of financial market 
variables could then be disaggregated into a response to economic outlook tone and a 
response to monetary policy tone. However even without this split, I am still able to show 
that the tone used in communication has a significant impact on financial markets and 
that this impact depends on the source and sign of the communication.   
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Appendix A: Additional Tables 
Tables 
Table A1: Summary of Tone Variables 
 Maximum  Minimum Average  Median 
Avg Tone 1.0000 -1.000 0.3097 0.3289 
NVP Tone 1.0000 -1.0000 0.2446 0.2549 
VP Tone -1.0000 1.0000 0.2852 0.2852 
Gov Tone 1.000 -0.7647 0.4230 0.4678 
Chair Tone -1.0000 1.0000 0.4648 0.4737 
Stmt Tone -1.000 1.0000 0.0433 0.1667 
Min Ton -0.4000 0.6071 0.1550 0.1648 
 
Table A2: Summary of Positive and Negative Tone Variables, Pre-Financial Crisis 
 Maximum  Minimum Average  Median 
Pos Tone 0.6958 0.0002 .28463 0.2636 
Neg Tone 1.3042 0.0017 0.2737 0.1931 
Pos NVP  0.7828 0.0012 0.3278 0.3049 
Neg NVP 1.2116 0.0027 0.2784 0.2162 
Pos VP 0.7308 0.0035 0.2971 0.2692 
Neg VP 0.8692 0.0025 0.2164 0.1859 
Pos Gov 0.5657 0.0005 0.2433 0.2397 
Neg Gov 0.8958 0.0001 0.2699 0.2238 
Pos Chair 0.5455 0.0049 0.2625 0.2597 
Neg Chair 1.4545 0.0101 0.2488 0.1629 
Pos Stmt 0.8571 0.0571 0.4262 0.3571 
Neg Stmt 1.1429 0.1429 0.5803 0.4762 
Pos Min 0.4412 0.0008 0.1851 0.1675 
Neg Min 0.5659 0.0010 0.1776 0.1183 
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Table A3: Summary of Positive and Negative Tone Variables, Post-Financial Crisis 
 Maximum  Minimum Average  Median 
Pos Tone 0.6958 0.0002 .28463 0.2636 
Neg Tone 1.3042 0.0017 0.2737 0.1931 
Pos NVP  0.7828 0.0012 0.3278 0.3049 
Neg NVP 1.2116 0.0027 0.2784 0.2162 
Pos VP 0.7308 0.0035 0.2971 0.2692 
Neg VP 0.8692 0.0025 0.2164 0.1859 
Pos Gov 0.5657 0.0005 0.2433 0.2397 
Neg Gov 0.8958 0.0001 0.2699 0.2238 
Pos Chair 0.5455 0.0049 0.2625 0.2597 
Neg Chair 1.4545 0.0101 0.2488 0.1629 
Pos Stmt 0.8571 0.0571 0.4262 0.3571 
Neg Stmt 1.1429 0.1429 0.5803 0.4762 
Pos Min 0.4412 0.0008 0.1851 0.1675 
Neg Min 0.5659 0.0010 0.1776 0.1183 
 
Table A4: Summary of Financial Market Series, Short Term 
 1-month 3-month  1-year 2-year 3-year 
Observations 3,751 4,281 4,281 4,281 4,281 
Mean  -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Standard Deviation 0.066 0.048 0.039 0.053 0.057 
Skewness -1.080 -1.536 0.067 -0.019 0.001 
Excess kurtosis 67.728 64.761 19.985 9.15 7.392 
Minimum -1.050 -0.810 -0.360 -0.450 -0.440 
Maximum 0.860 0.760 0.520 0.380 0.370 
 
Table A5: Summary of Financial Market Series, Long Term 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
Observations 4,281 4,281 4,281 4,281 
Mean  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.01 
Standard Deviation 0.061 0.062 0.059 1.215 
Skewness 0.012 0.006 -0.035 -0.356 
Excess kurtosis 5.809 5.614 5.425 10.359 
Minimum -0.460 -0.530 -0.510 -9.470 
Maximum 0.340 0.300 0.250 10.246 
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Table A6: Reaction of Financial Market Returns to Average Tone, Full Sample,  
Short Term 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
 
 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
Fed Funds 0.0167*** 0.0160*** 0.0148*** 0.0636*** 0.0078*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0054) (0.0019) 
PPI   -0.0024**   
   (0.0010)   
CPI 0.0039**     
 (0.0018)     
NHS -0.0014** 0.0017***    
 (0.0014) (0.0005)    
NFP   0.0052** 0.0116** 0.0130*** 
   (0.0022) (0.0051) (0.0042) 
JC   0.0024***   
   (0.0008)   
RS 0.0074*** 0.0021* 0.0044*** 0.0079*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0014) 
GDP    0.0095** 0.0110** 
    (0.0039) (0.0046) 
CUR 0.0074*** 0.0021* 0.0044*** 0.0079*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0014) 
ISM 0.0028**  -0.0034*** 0.0075** 0.0080* 
 (0.0011)  (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0045) 
ECI -0.0027 -0.0106***  0.0068*  
 (0.0035) (0.0009)  (0.0040)  
CS -0.0053***  0.0049***   
 (0.0014)  (0.0012)   
DGO  -0.0054***    
  (0.0006)    
VIX Index -0.0132*** -0.0238*** -0.0321*** -0.0442*** -0.0551*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0068) (0.0080) 
Avg Tone -0.0076*** -0.0012 0.0029** 0.0018 0.0048* 
 (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0029) 
Tone Disp -0.0074*** -0.0017** 0.0016 0.0029 0.0059* 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0032) 
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Table A7: Reaction of Financial Market Returns to Average Tone, Full Sample, Long 
Term 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
Fed Funds 0.0053**   -0.2041*** 
 (0.0026)   (0.0521) 
PPI    -0.1292*** 
    (0.0437) 
NFP 0.0128** 0.0117* 0.0107  
 (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0065)  
RS 0.0130*** 0.0135*** 0.0165***  
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0029)  
GDP 0.0106* 0.0095*   
 (0.0054) (0.0057)   
UR  0.0051*   
  (0.0030)   
CUR 0.0091** 0.0092** 0.0067*  
 (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0035)  
ISM 0.0104** 0.0127*** 0.0141*** 0.1384*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0519) 
CS    0.1209* 
    (0.0648) 
VIX Index -0.0652*** -0.0691*** -0.0566*** -2.0827*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0084) (0.1100) 
Avg Tone 0.0050 0.0028 0.0022 -0.0978* 
 (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0519) 
Tone Disp 0.0051 0.0055 0.0043 0.0517 
 (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0587) 
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Table A8: Reaction of Financial Returns to Type Specific Tone, Full Sample, Short Term 
 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
Fed Funds 0.0125*** 0.0164*** 0.0138*** 0.0335*** 0.0070*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
PPI   -0.0019*   
   (0.0010)   
CPI 0.0032*     
 (0.0019)     
NHS 0.0032*     
 (0.0019)     
NFP   0.0053** 0.0117** 0.0132*** 
   (0.0027) (0.0047) (0.0044) 
JC  -0.0014*** 0.0024*** 0.0029**  
  (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0013)  
RS 0.0066***  0.0044*** 0.0113*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.0014)  (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0014) 
GDP  -0.0054***  0.0116*** 0.0113** 
  (0.0013)  (0.0039) (0.0045) 
CUR 0.0070*** 0.0042*** 0.0055*** 0.0083*** 0.0097*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0034) 
ISM 0.0023*  -0.0033*** 0.0072* 0.0078* 
 (0.0013)  (0.0011) (0.0037) (0.0045) 
CS   0.0048***   
   (0.0012)   
DGO  -0.0056*** 0.0023 -0.0042**  
  (0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0018)  
VIX Index -0.0393*** -0.0254*** -0.0327*** -0.0537*** -0.0567*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0068) (0.0080) 
NVP Tone -0.0022 -0.0004 -0.0052*** 0.0029 0.0025 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0037) (0.0046) 
VP Tone 0.0002 -0.0033** -0.0023 -0.0030 -0.0059 
 (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0048) (0.0056) 
Gov Tone -0.0160*** -0.0032 0.0054** 0.0065 0.0049 
 (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0045) (0.0054) 
Chair Tone 0.0026 0.0042* 0.0074*** 0.0054 0.0031 
 (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0046) (0.0060) 
Stmt Tone 0.0197*** 0.0046*** 0.0093*** 0.0076* 0.0145*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0043) (0.0051) 
Min Tone -0.0413*** -0.0115 -0.0160* -0.0150 -0.0390** 
 (0.0054) (0.0093) (0.0086) (0.0142) (0.0199) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table A9: Reaction of Financial Returns to Type Specific Tone, Full Sample, Long Term 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
Fed Funds    -0.2043*** 
    (0.0558) 
PPI    -0.1367*** 
    (0.0436) 
NFP 0.0129** 0.0118* 0.0107  
 (0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0066)  
RS 0.0131*** 0.0135*** 0.0165***  
 (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0029)  
GDP 0.0111** 0.0096*   
 (0.0053) (0.0056)   
UR  0.0053*   
  (0.0031)   
CUR 0.0093** 0.0094** 0.0069**  
 (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0035)  
ISM 0.0102** 0.0125** 0.0139*** 0.1340** 
 (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0527) 
CS    0.1368** 
    (0.0624) 
VIX Index -0.0663*** -0.0707*** -0.0584*** -1.9915*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0085) (0.1105) 
NVP Tone 0.0035 0.0032 0.0049 -0.1566* 
 (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0803) 
VP Tone -0.0058 -0.0050 -0.0032 0.0427 
 (0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0067) (0.1122) 
Gov Tone 0.0018 0.0019 0.0022 0.0638 
 (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0063) (0.1128) 
Chair Tone -0.0001 -0.0045 -0.0061 -0.2856*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0699) 
Stmt Tone 0.0196*** 0.0070 0.0027 -0.2078** 
 (0.0058) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0972) 
Min Tone -0.0041 -0.0116 -0.0194 0.7009** 
 (0.0241) (0.0259) (0.0237) (0.3493) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table A10: Reaction of Financial Returns to Positive and Negative Tone, Full Sample, 
Short Term 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
 
 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
Fed Funds 0.0141*** 0.0161*** 0.0150*** 0.0637*** 0.0083*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0054) (0.0020) 
PPI   -0.0024**   
   (0.0011)   
CPI 0.0030**     
 (0.0015)     
NHS -0.0097*** -0.0241*** -0.0320*** -0.0443*** -0.0556*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0068) (0.0080) 
NFP   -0.0024**   
   (0.0011)   
JC   0.0024***   
   (0.0008)   
RS 0.0071*** 0.0021* 0.0044*** 0.0079*** 0.0107*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0014) 
GDP    0.0095** 0.0110** 
    (0.0039) (0.0046) 
CUR -0.0133*** 0.0042*** 0.0054*** 0.0048* 0.0096*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0034) 
ISM 0.0032***  -0.0034*** 0.0075** 0.0078* 
 (0.0012)  (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0045) 
ECI  -0.0106***  0.0068*  
  (0.0009)  (0.0040)  
CS -0.0050***  0.0048***   
 (0.0010)  (0.0012)   
DGO  -0.0057***    
  (0.0006)    
VIX Index -0.0097*** -0.0241*** -0.0320*** -0.0443*** -0.0556*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0068) (0.0080) 
Pos Tone -0.0148*** -0.0046*** 0.0054** 0.0023 0.0084 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0039) (0.0053) 
Neg Tone -0.0103*** -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0018 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0042) 
Tone Disp -0.0046*** -0.0015* 0.0014 0.0028 0.0055* 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0032) 
  45 
 
 
Table A11: Reaction of Financial Returns to Positive and Negative Tone, Full Sample, 
Long Term 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
 
 
 
 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
Fed Funds 0.0052*   -0.1929*** 
 (0.0027)   (0.0525) 
PPI    -0.1317*** 
    (0.0435) 
NFP 0.0128** 0.0117* 0.0107  
 (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0065)  
RS 0.0130*** 0.0135*** 0.0165***  
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0029)  
GDP 0.0106** 0.0095*   
 (0.0054) (0.0057)   
UR  0.0051*   
  (0.0030)   
CUR 0.0091** 0.0092** 0.0067*  
 (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0035)  
ISM 0.0105** 0.0127*** 0.0140*** 0.1329** 
 (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0519) 
CS    0.1202* 
    (0.0650) 
VIX Index -0.0651*** -0.0691*** -0.0567*** -2.1193*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0084) (0.1121) 
Pos Tone 0.0042 0.0029 0.0032 0.0119 
 (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0931) 
Neg Tone -0.0058 -0.0027 -0.0012 0.2079*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0631) 
Tone Disp 0.0052 0.0055 0.0042 0.0392 
 (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0586) 
  46 
 
 
Table A12: Reaction of Financial Market Returns to Average Tone, Post Financial 
Crisis, Short Term 
 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
Fed Funds 0.0073*** 0.0176*** 0.0149*** 0.0253***  
 (0.0008) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0039)  
PPI  -0.0016*** -0.0024*** -0.0040***  
  (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0015)  
CPI -0.0055*** 0.0028**    
 (0.0021) (0.0011)    
NFP 0.0189** -0.0168** -0.0509*** -0.0578*** -0.0505*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0082) (0.0050) (0.0132) (0.0169) 
JC   0.0019*** 0.0035*** 0.0038** 
   (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0017) 
RS 0.0044*** 0.0020 0.0093*** 0.0157*** 0.0202*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0019) (0.0030) 
GDP 0.0001 -0.0043***    
 (0.0022) (0.0012)    
UR  0.0017** 0.0018*   
  (0.0007) (0.0009)   
CUR -0.0096***   0.0069**  
 (0.0008)   (0.0029)  
ISM 0.0029***   0.0091** 0.0108* 
 (0.0011)   (0.0042) (0.0058) 
CS -0.0052*** -0.0052*** -0.0026***   
 (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005)   
DGO 0.0083*** 0.0041*** 0.0010   
 (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0015)   
VIX Index 0.0277*** 0.0079*** -0.0236*** -0.0497*** -0.0460*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0052) (0.0072) 
Avg Tone 0.0019* -0.0035*** -0.0008 -0.0014 0.0003 
 (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0036) 
Tone Disp 0.0030*** -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0048 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0035) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table A13: Reaction of Financial Market Returns to Average Tone, Post Financial 
Crisis, Long Term 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
PPI   -0.0047*  
   (0.0026)  
NFP -0.0528** -0.0446* -0.0396  
 (0.0232) (0.0249) (0.0271)  
JC 0.0042* 0.0045* 0.0041*  
 (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0025)  
RS 0.0231*** 0.0237*** 0.0251***  
 (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0052)  
UR 0.0073** 0.0078*  -0.1316** 
 (0.0036) (0.0041)  (0.0623) 
CUR     
     
ISM 0.0118** 0.0162*** 0.0193*** 0.4212*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0824) 
VIX Index -0.0729*** -0.0821*** -0.0649*** -2.2533*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.1357) 
Avg Tone 0.0035 0.0038 0.0035 -0.2140*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0637) 
Tone Disp 0.0034 0.0041 0.0030 0.0386 
 (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0798) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table A14: Reaction of Financial Returns to Type Specific Tone, Post Financial Crisis, 
Short Term 
 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
Fed Funds 0.0159*** 0.0128*** 0.0143*** 0.0240***  
 (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0042)  
PPI   -0.0026*** -0.0041***  
   (0.0006) (0.0015)  
CPI  0.0028**    
  (0.0011)    
NFP  -0.0176** -0.0491*** -0.0554*** -0.0496*** 
  (0.0086) (0.0048) (0.0133) (0.0160) 
JC   0.0016*** 0.0035*** 0.0040** 
   (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0017) 
RS   0.0091*** 0.0151*** 0.0205*** 
   (0.0005) (0.0020) (0.0031) 
GDP  0.0136***    
  (0.0010)    
UR  0.0015*    
  (0.0008)    
CUR -0.0053***   0.0070**  
 (0.0010)   (0.0028)  
ISM 0.0024***   0.0092** 0.0102* 
 (0.0009)   (0.0041) (0.0057) 
ECI  0.0128***    
  (0.0016)    
CS -0.0054*** -0.0049*** -0.0022***   
 (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0006)   
DGO  0.0037***    
  (0.0007)    
VIX Index 0.0374*** 0.0113*** -0.0239*** -0.0484*** -0.0459*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0055) (0.0075) 
NVP Tone 0.0053*** -0.0022* -0.0056*** 0.0000 0.0011 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0036) (0.0051) 
VP Tone 0.0061*** -0.0036** -0.0021 0.0007 -0.0031 
 (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0041) (0.0065) 
Gov Tone -0.0154*** 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0025 -0.0061 
 (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0045) (0.0061) 
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 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
Chair Tone 0.0115*** 0.0021 0.0063*** -0.0107*** -0.0036 
 (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0039) (0.0065) 
Stmt Tone 0.0177*** 0.0013 0.0025 0.0051 0.0071 
 (0.0041) (0.0021) (0.0042) (0.0072) (0.0075) 
Min Tone 0.0216*** 0.0313*** 0.0133 0.0152 0.0378** 
 (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.0127) (0.0229) (0.0181) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table A15: Reaction of Financial Returns to Type Specific Tone, Post Financial Crisi, 
Long Term 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
NFP -0.0526** -0.0441* -0.0441*  
 (0.0229) (0.0248) (0.0248)  
JC 0.0040*    
 (0.0023)    
RS 0.0233*** 0.0241*** 0.0241***  
 (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0050)  
UR 0.0078** 0.0077* 0.0077* -0.1364** 
 (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0574) 
ISM 0.0115** 0.0165*** 0.0165*** 0.4401*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0797) 
VIX Index -0.0738*** -0.0827*** -0.0827*** -2.5597*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.1369) 
NVP Tone 0.0028 0.0038 0.0038 -0.1114 
 (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.1055) 
VP Tone -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 0.0845 
 (0.0093) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.1463) 
Gov Tone -0.0059 -0.0043 -0.0043 0.1488 
 (0.0082) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.1531) 
Chair Tone -0.0090 -0.0139 -0.0139 -0.7177*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0750) 
Stmt Tone 0.0173* 0.0065 0.0065 -0.9318*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.1507) 
Min Tone 0.0905*** 0.0722** 0.0722** 0.4502 
 (0.0273) (0.0365) (0.0365) (0.4609) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table A16: Reaction of Financial Returns to Positive and Negative Tone, Post Financial 
Crisis, Short Term 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
Fed Funds 0.0141*** 0.0161*** 0.0150*** 0.0637*** 0.0083*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0054) (0.0020) 
PPI   -0.0024**   
   (0.0011)   
CPI 0.0030**     
 (0.0015)     
NHS -0.0097*** -0.0241*** -0.0320*** -0.0443*** -0.0556*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0068) (0.0080) 
NFP   -0.0024**   
   (0.0011)   
JC   0.0024***   
   (0.0008)   
RS 0.0071*** 0.0021* 0.0044*** 0.0079*** 0.0107*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0014) 
GDP    0.0095** 0.0110** 
    (0.0039) (0.0046) 
CUR -0.0133*** 0.0042*** 0.0054*** 0.0048* 0.0096*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0034) 
ISM 0.0032***  -0.0034*** 0.0075** 0.0078* 
 (0.0012)  (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0045) 
ECI  -0.0106***  0.0068*  
  (0.0009)  (0.0040)  
CS -0.0050***  0.0048***   
 (0.0010)  (0.0012)   
DGO  -0.0057***    
  (0.0006)    
VIX Index -0.0097*** -0.0241*** -0.0320*** -0.0443*** -0.0556*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0068) (0.0080) 
Pos Tone -0.0148*** -0.0046*** 0.0054** 0.0023 0.0084 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0039) (0.0053) 
Neg Tone -0.0103*** -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0018 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0042) 
Tone Disp -0.0046*** -0.0015* 0.0014 0.0028 0.0055* 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0032) 
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Table A17: Reaction of Financial Returns to Positive and Negative Tone, Post Financial 
Crisis, Long Term 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
 
 
 
 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
Fed Funds 0.0052*   -0.1929*** 
 (0.0027)   (0.0525) 
PPI    -0.1317*** 
    (0.0435) 
NFP 0.0128** 0.0117* 0.0107  
 (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0065)  
RS 0.0130*** 0.0135*** 0.0165***  
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0029)  
GDP 0.0106** 0.0095*   
 (0.0054) (0.0057)   
UR  0.0051*   
  (0.0030)   
CUR 0.0091** 0.0092** 0.0067*  
 (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0035)  
ISM 0.0105** 0.0127*** 0.0140*** 0.1329** 
 (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0519) 
CS    0.1202* 
    (0.0650) 
VIX Index -0.0651*** -0.0691*** -0.0567*** -2.1193*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0084) (0.1121) 
Pos Tone 0.0042 0.0029 0.0032 0.0119 
 (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0931) 
Neg Tone -0.0058 -0.0027 -0.0012 0.2079*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0631) 
Tone Disp 0.0052 0.0055 0.0042 0.0392 
 (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0586) 
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Table A18: Reaction of Financial Market Returns to Type Specific Positive and Negative 
Tone, Full Sample, Short Term 
 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
Fed Funds 0.0063*** 0.0114*** 0.0136*** 0.0338*** 0.0084*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0020) 
PPI   -0.0019*   
   (0.0010)   
CPI 0.0055***     
 (0.0017)     
NHS -0.0021     
 (0.0016)     
NFP   0.0053* 0.0116** 0.0130*** 
   (0.0028) (0.0046) (0.0043) 
JC   0.0024*** 0.0028**  
   (0.0008) (0.0014)  
RS 0.0068***  0.0044*** 0.0115*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.0014)  (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
GDP  0.0067***  0.0116*** 0.0115** 
  (0.0011)  (0.0039) (0.0045) 
CUR -0.0134*** 0.0050*** 0.0055*** 0.0086*** 0.0100*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0034) 
ISM   -0.0034*** 0.0070* 0.0077* 
   (0.0011) (0.0037) (0.0045) 
ECI -0.0037 0.0073***    
 (0.0024) (0.0011)    
CS -0.0048***  0.0048***   
 (0.0013)  (0.0012)   
DGO  -0.0070***  -0.0039**  
  (0.0005)  (0.0019)  
VIX Index -0.0150*** -0.0207*** -0.0322*** -0.0549*** -0.0562*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0069) (0.0079) 
Pos NVP -0.0075*** -0.0024 -0.0046 0.0042 0.0033 
 (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0055) (0.0070) 
Neg NVP -0.0050* -0.0011 0.0049 -0.0024 -0.0018 
 (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0058) (0.0070) 
Pos VP -0.0129*** -0.0086*** -0.0022 0.0012 0.0006 
 (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0039) (0.0063) (0.0077) 
Neg VP -0.0110*** 0.0022 0.0026 0.0078 0.0131 
 (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0047) (0.0082) (0.0090) 
Pos Gov -0.0184*** -0.0021 0.0155*** 0.0228*** 0.0201** 
 (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0083) (0.0098) 
Neg Gov 0.0138*** 0.0027 -0.0021 0.0017 0.0035 
 (0.0009) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0057) (0.0069) 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1-month 3-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
Pos Chair 0.0098*** -0.0024 0.0111** 0.0038 0.0020 
 (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0046) (0.0099) (0.0112) 
Neg Chair -0.0077*** -0.0066* -0.0055 -0.0052 -0.0030 
 (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0056) (0.0075) 
Pos Stmt -0.0091*** -0.0237*** 0.0025 0.0428*** 0.0435*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0051) (0.0092) (0.0116) 
Neg Stmt -0.0746*** -0.0598*** -0.0108*** 0.0082 -0.0009 
 (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0035) (0.0053) (0.0058) 
Pos Min -0.0146 0.0008 -0.0015 0.0088 0.0211 
 (0.0196) (0.0112) (0.0133) (0.0242) (0.0344) 
Neg Min 0.0392*** 0.0261* 0.0313*** 0.0332* 0.0861*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0139) (0.0116) (0.0183) (0.0270) 
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Table A19: Reaction of Financial Market Returns to Type Specific Positive and Negative 
Tone, Full Sample, Long Term 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
Fed Funds 0.0051*   -0.1671*** 
 (0.0027)   (0.0528) 
PPI  0.0051*   
  (0.0031)   
NFP 0.0128** 0.0117* 0.0106  
 (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0065)  
JC     
     
RS 0.0129*** 0.0132*** 0.0160***  
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0029)  
GDP 0.0107** 0.0095*   
 (0.0054) (0.0057)   
UR  0.0051*   
  (0.0031)   
CUR 0.0096** 0.0097** 0.0071**  
 (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0035)  
ISM 0.0101** 0.0123** 0.0137*** 0.1329*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0516) 
CS    0.1288** 
    (0.0636) 
VIX Index -0.0657*** -0.0710*** -0.0589*** -2.2073*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0085) (0.1151) 
Pos NVP 0.0023 0.0016 0.0030 -0.4423*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0077) (0.1114) 
Neg NVP -0.0050 -0.0047 -0.0065 -0.1316 
 (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0088) (0.1206) 
Pos VP 0.0018 0.0051 0.0070 0.1540 
 (0.0099) (0.0103) (0.0097) (0.1547) 
Neg VP 0.0142 0.0158 0.0143 0.1246 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.1734) 
Pos Gov 0.0106 0.0102 0.0090 0.3218 
 (0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0112) (0.2002) 
Neg Gov 0.0033 0.0029 0.0018 0.0892 
 (0.0079) (0.0084) (0.0080) (0.1421) 
Pos Chair 0.0004 -0.0022 -0.0028 0.0606 
 (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.2340) 
Neg Chair 0.0011 0.0067 0.0089 0.5468*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0101) (0.0094) (0.0711) 
Pos Stmt 0.0381*** 0.0291** 0.0215 0.9828*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.2579) 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5-year 7-year 10-year S&P 500 
     
Neg Stmt -0.0078 0.0037 0.0072 0.7281*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0079) (0.0077) (0.1102) 
Pos Min 0.0512 0.0541 0.0449 0.1926 
 (0.0381) (0.0400) (0.0402) (0.6700) 
Neg Min 0.0506 0.0653* 0.0707** -1.0573** 
 (0.0326) (0.0338) (0.0303) (0.4141) 
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Appendix B: Figures 
Figure B1: Federal Reserve Communication Events, May 1999-March 2018 
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Figure B2: Federal Funds Rate Surprise, May 1999-March 2018 
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